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This paper makes a series of inter-related points. (1) The main features of
a Palestinian-Israeli agreement for a "two-state" solution-if such an agree-
ment is to be achieved-have become very clear. (2) The long-term success of
such an agreement in meeting the needs of the two state will depend on the
viability of the Palestinian state that is created, which in turn will depend on
three features-contiguity of Palestinian territories, permeability of the border
with Israel, and normal human security for its citizens. (3) The current political
climate does not allow the creation of such a state through standard bilateral
negotiations. Indeed, the prospect facing both sides is a second disengage-
ment-this time from the occupied West Bank regions with only small minori-
ties of Israeli settlers-and the ending of negotiations with no immediate
prospect for any of the three features stipulated above. (4) The necessary
requirements for viability can only be achieved if mutual trust between the
sides can be created, trust that provisions will be faithfully enacted and adhered
to, and trust that the agreement will truly mark the end of the conflict. (5) To
build that trust, we propose a strategy involving unilateral, reciprocal steps in
which each side, recognizing the interdependence of the interests of the two
sides, acts in a manner that both serves its own interests and signals a willing-
ness to consider the other side's interests as well. (6) Critical to the success of
this strategy is the need for both sides to communicate a view of the future that
includes the other side in a way that affords its citizens a status and everyday
life that they will find tolerable even if it does not satisfy their notions of jus-
tice. Indeed, people on both sides (but especially the Palestinians for whom the
absence of an agreement or the failure of their state would be especially disas-
trous) will be called upon to sacrifice some measure of what they deem fair or
appropriate to achieve peace.
I. INTRODUCTION
While a final resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not on the
immediate political horizon, many informed observers believe that the main
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features of what this settlement will entail-if any settlement is to be reached-
are reasonably clear.' It will involve a two-state solution based upon the fol-
lowing principles:
A. Jerusalem will be shared according to a mutually acceptable arrange-
ment concerning the status of East Jerusalem as the capital of the new
Palestinian state and the right of each side to exercise authority over its
holiest sites.
B. The border between the two states will essentially follow the pre-1967
border, but land will be swapped so that some heavily populated Israeli
settlements are incorporated into Israel in return for a mutually agreed
upon transfer of territory to the new Palestinian state.
C. The vast majority of Palestinian refugees will exercise their right of
return within the newly created Palestinian state and receive compen-
sation (or some other form of additional aid) from Israel and third
parties.'
D. The relationship between the new Palestinian state and Israel will be
founded upon mutual commitment to the human security of both its
citizens.3
Many valid objections could be raised from both an Israeli or Palestinian
perspective regarding the features of this settlement. Neither side is likely to
think that the terms it imposes are fair or just. Many, and perhaps even most,
individuals on both sides will believe that particular aspects impose injustice on
them that they should not have to endure and that the relevant terms fall far
short of what even a minimally just settlement should offer. Furthermore,
many will feel that the settlement inflicts painful costs on their side and offers
only modest gains, while rewarding the other side with almost everything of
significance that it wanted without requiring them to make any similarly pain-
ful concessions. Moreover, people on both sides will feel that the terms we
have outlined represent a betrayal of the most heartfelt hopes and aspirations,
In stating that the requirements for a settlement that satisfies the minimum demands of the
two sides in the conflict are clear, we are not claiming that such a resolution, much less a
resolution in the near future, is inevitable. While polls consistently indicate that a majority
of both Israelis and Palestinians would (in many cases only reluctantly) accept a settlement
based on these principles, they will not do so unless they are convinced that the other side
intends (and has the capacity) to fully honor, and continue to honor, its provisions in a
manner that would finally end the conflict. In the absence of such trust, many important and
powerful Israeli and Palestinian constituencies prefer to continue the conflict in the hopes of
increasing their leverage and creating different "facts on the ground." Accordingly, any
significant progress toward peace on the basis of this widely accepted set of principles will
ultimately depend upon building such mutual trust-trust regarding not only the other side's
intentions, but also regarding their willingness and capacity to convert, marginalize, or other-
wise disempower its would be "spoilers."
2 In this regard, it is important to develop the capacity of the Palestinian state to absorb
refugees and to give the refugees some "ideological compensation." See Robert H. Mnookin
et at., Barriers to Progress at the Negotiation Table: International Conflicts Among Israelis
And Among Palestinians, 6 NEV. L.J. 299 (2006).
1 Our use of the term "human security" comes from many quarters; however, Walid Salem
has introduced it to us in a new way regarding the relationships between Palestinian and
Israeli. Walid Salem, Settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: What's to be Done?,
Interdisciplinary Seminar at Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation, Stan-
ford University (Feb. 2, 2005).
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and a betrayal of those who have devoted or even given up their lives in the
struggle.
Our assertion that the proposed terms offer the only imaginable settlement
that is achievable thus does not rest on the conviction that either or both parties
will be satisfied or reassured by those terms. Indeed, we are absolutely con-
vinced that neither side will find this settlement satisfying or reassuring! Nor
are we asserting that this should be the settlement-for example, that the Pales-
tinians should give up the right of return or that the Israelis should share Jeru-
salem and consent to the '67 borders. Again, we claim only that this list of
principles represents the bare minimum of what both sides might be willing to
accept under the very best of conditions. In other words, it represents the only
plausible arrangement that would allow Israelis and Palestinians to coexist in
relative peace-that any significant deviation from it would cause one side or
the other (or perhaps both) to feel that its fundamental interests would be better
served by continuing the struggle.4
Our concern in this paper is not with the features of this proposed agree-
ment per se but with a deeper problem lurking below these features that is
frequently overlooked. Even if the terms of settlement were fully implemented,
it would not necessarily produce real and lasting peace. For this to occur, the
Palestinian state that emerges from that settlement must be a viable one.5
While the existence of a Palestinian state by itself is no guarantee of peace, it is
impossible to imagine a lasting stable peace without it. Only a successful Pal-
estinian state (i.e., one with a viable economy, a competent and uncorrupt cen-
tral authority able to curtail factional violence, and the rule of law) could come
anywhere close to meeting the requirements necessary for peaceful coexistence
between Palestinians and Israelis as laid out in the Roadmap.
In the absence of a truly viable Palestinian state capable of meeting the
legitimate needs of its citizens, neither Palestinians nor Israelis would enjoy the
I For example, Palestinians could write a version that places priority on open borders and
contiguity of territory and makes suppression of terrorism contingent on the realization of
these conditions. Likewise, Israelis might write a version that emphasizes their security
concerns and makes all future concession to Palestinians contingent on meeting these to their
satisfaction. Such provisions certainly would increase support for the agreement among
their core constituencies. However, both Israelis and Palestinians have well-founded reason
to reject these and other "improvements" offered by the other side. Indeed, each side would
feel that any departure from the terms we have outlined would have to entail movement in a
direction that better served its own interests (and its own views about the requirements forjustice). It is this shared conviction about the requirements of any change, in fact, that
eliminates room for maneuvering and precludes the possibility of an alternative agreement
acceptable to both sides.
5 The RAND Report states:
Creating a state of Palestine does not ensure its success. But for Palestinians, Israelis, and many
around the world, it is profoundly important that the state succeed. If the failed or failing states
of recent years-Somalia, Yugoslavia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Afghani-
stan-have endangered international security, consider the perils in the Middle East and beyond
of a failed Palestine, or the costs and risks of one so weak that it must be propped up and policed
by the United States and others. The true challenge for a Palestinian state is not that it exist, but
that it succeed.
THE RAND PALESTINIAN STATE STUDY TEAM, THE RAND CORP., BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL
PALESTINIAN STATE 2 (2005).
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fruits of peace. Indeed, Israelis would be forced to live with the consequences
of a non-viable Palestinian state as much as would Palestinians.6 Israelis would
be condemned to living beside an aggrieved and resentful people primed to
vent their anger and frustration on them-especially if Israeli pursuit of their
own economic, political, and security interests were the cause, or were seen as
the cause, of Palestinian woes. In short, as the recent RAND study Building a
Successful Palestinian State concludes, "The true challenge for a Palestinian
state is not that it exist, but that it succeed.
' 7
The RAND study defines a viable Palestinian state as "an independent,
democratic state with an effective government operating under the rule of law
in a safe and secure environment that provides for economic development and
supports adequate housing, food, education, and public services for its peo-
ple."8 This is, indeed, a very tall order given the current situation. The study
calls for improvements in four areas: (1) security, (2) governance and political
legitimacy, (3) economic viability, and (4) social well-being.9 Taken individu-
ally, each of these is enormously difficult; taken collectively, they threaten to
overwhelm the capacity of the Palestinians as well as the international donor
nations. Addressing each of these adequately will, no doubt, require a monu-
mental effort supported by technical knowledge and specialized skills and
backed by a large infusion of international aid.
However, our goal is not to critique or supplement the RAND study or to
offer alternative suggestions for meeting the formidable technical challenges of
building competent institutions of governance. Instead, we will address a fun-
damental problem that the authors of the study explicitly stated that they were
not going to address-that is, the issue of "how an independent Palestinian
state might be created" or "the process or terms that would lead to its crea-
tion."1 ° Specifically, we will explore the role that a coordinated strategy of
reciprocal unilateral actions might play in overcoming the relational barriers
between the Palestinians and Israelis that we and others feel impede the goal of
a viable Palestinian state living in peace with Israel.
Our emphasis on unilateral steps is dictated not by a personal preference
for unilateralism. On the contrary, there is nothing that we, and most other
people who want peace in the Middle East, would welcome more than a "nor-
mal," interest-based, negotiation whereby each party makes disproportionate
concessions on the issues it deems less important than its longtime adversary in
return for disproportionate concessions on the issues it deems more important.
6 We do not suggest here that the situations of the two sides are symmetric. Indeed, the lack
of symmetry both in present circumstances and in the consequences of failure to achieve a
satisfactory settlement of the conflict is an important part of the problem that confronts us.
While the optimal outcome for both Israelis and Palestinians would be a viable Palestinian
state living peacefully alongside Israel with free flow of goods and of labor, the most likely
alternative-that is, further disengagement between Israel and a failed Palestinian state-
would not be equally disastrous for the two sides. Such an outcome would leave Israelis
insecure while still able to lead some semblance of normal life, but it would perpetuate and
perhaps even worsen an already unbearable existence for Palestinians.
7 THE RAND PALESTINIAN STATE STUDY TEAM, supra note 5, at 2.
8 Id. at 3.
9 Id.
lO See id. at 1.
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But it is exactly such a negotiation that has been precluded by the various
barriers-structural, strategic, and psychological as well as relational and polit-
ical-that we at SCCN have long studied. In a sense, therefore, we start out
with a simple proposition. In pursuit of peace, each side should identify
whatever steps are consistent with its own interests that can be taken unilater-
ally, and take them! At the same time, it should identify the steps it needs the
other side to take and consider what factors or barriers prevent them from tak-
ing those steps. Finally, it should consider what steps it can take unilaterally,
or by mutual agreement, to remove those factors or barriers.
Before we proceed further with our discussion, however, we want to
acknowledge an important asymmetry that complicates the political landscape
and frames our analysis. The immediate future that Israelis will most likely
face holds the prospect of a range of more preferred and less preferred out-
comes. While many Israelis recognize the ways in which their interests might
be served if a viable Palestinian state materializes, most feel that they could
live, albeit less securely and perhaps less prosperously, with the consequences
of a failed state or no state at all. The future for most Israelis, in either case, is
likely to be bearable. For Palestinians, the options are much less agreeable.
Given the political and economic realities that exist at present, the immediate
future-even one that includes a functioning state-is bound, at best, to be
difficult and perhaps only minimally bearable. Furthermore, if the future
brings a failed state, or no state, that future, for most Palestinians, is almost
certain to be utterly unbearable. Thus, while both parties have a stake in the
outcome, and most people on both sides of the conflict may recognize that,
ceteris paribus, a viable Palestinian state is in their mutual interest, it seems
clear that the failure to produce a viable state will weigh much more heavily on
the Palestinians than the Israelis." It is largely because of this asymmetry that
our analysis will focus more heavily on what Palestinians might be able to do to
secure an outcome that they can live with. Ultimately, however, our analysis
speaks to the fundamental choices that both societies face and thus to the con-
clusions we will draw about constructive steps for the future.
II. THE DILEMMA IN A NUTSHELL: THE DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP
AMONG VIABILITY REQUIREMENTS
Beyond detailing the specific features of a functioning state, the RAND
study identified three crosscutting issues-permeability of borders, contiguity
of territory, and human security-that hold the key to the nature of such a
state.' 2 Indeed, although there are many features of the current situation that
are highly fluid and subject to potential deterioration, the centrality of these
issues to any settlement cannot be overstated. A Palestinian state that has
sealed borders, discontinuous territory, and a high level of insecurity will
almost assuredly fail. But a failure to achieve any one of the characteristics
" In negotiation parlance, the Israelis have the stronger BATNA or "best alternative to a
negotiation agreement"-a circumstance that further reflects the relative power that parties
bring to the negotiation table.
12 THE RAND PALESTINIAN STATE STUDY TEAM, supra note 5, at 7-9.
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identified in the Rand report, we believe, would ultimately undermine the exis-
tence of the others, and in all likelihood doom the whole state-building project.
Moreover, there is a dynamic relationship among these viability require-
ments in that progress with regard to one requirement could either facilitate or
inhibit progress towards another requirement, depending on how the require-
ment in question is achieved. Consider, for example, the issue of permeable
borders, and the free flow of labor, products, and services across the state
boundary separating Israel and Palestine that would be made possible by such
borders. If Israeli security concerns-real, imagined, or even politically
manipulated-lead to the sealing of that boarder, the short term effect might be
a decrease in Israeli feelings of vulnerability, and hence a reduction in the like-
lihood of anti-terrorist incursions into Palestine. However, any short-term gain
in security obtained at the cost of sealed borders would obviously hamper the
future economic growth that is needed to provide Palestinians with a tolerable
standard of living and would also interrupt the social and cultural bonds of
those Palestinians who have family and friends living in Israel. Both of these
latter factors would work to undermine the legitimacy of the Palestinian gov-
ernment and thus diminish not only its capacity to provide security to its citi-
zens but also its ability to suppress violence directed toward Israel.
On the other hand, if the borders are left open despite the security risks in
question, the Palestinian economy will likely grow, and Palestinians will expe-
rience less social and cultural disruption. This should enhance the legitimacy
of the Palestinian state in the eyes ofits people and, thus, improve its capacity
to provide security to the citizens of both states and even to suppress factions
that oppose peaceful coexistence and advocate violent militant action. But if
open borders lead to intolerable levels of violence directed at Israel, the result
will inevitably be political, economic, and/or military reprisals that both dimin-
ish the security and economic viability of the Palestinian state and discourage
concessions that would further the goal of territorial contiguity.
Or consider the issue of territorial contiguity. A Palestinian state com-
posed of disjointed cantons would be easier for Israel to manage or control
when it feels endangered. In particular, such a state would be more dependent
on Israel for its economic livelihood and, thus, vulnerable to sanctions that
Israel might choose to impose. But a state of this sort would enjoy little politi-
cal legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians and would therefore have very limited
ability to achieve economic progress and solve other problems that foster anti-
Israeli militancy. In fact, both public safety for Palestinians and the ability to
curb violent actions against Israel would suffer in the absence of territorial con-
tiguity, as problems of coordination, communication, and cooperation between
different cantons all become more complex and difficult.13 Mounting poverty,
deterioration of public safety, and hence political dissatisfaction become inevi-
table, and the weakened state would increasingly lose its monopoly on the use
of violence-the defining property of a functioning state. While having cata-
strophic effect on the well-being of Palestinian people, these developments, if
13 Faced with challenges that arise from fragmented states, the RAND report concluded,
"Even the most challenging peacekeeping experiences-Cyprus, Bosnia, and Kosovo-
might seem easy by comparison." Id. at 8.
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they come about, will undoubtedly put Israeli security under greater, not lesser,
strain.
If we focus instead on human security, the same interdependencies arise.
Across the world, citizens everywhere grant legitimacy to the state in propor-
tion to the protection they receive from it.14 In other words, the viability of a
future Palestinian state ultimately rests upon the confidence that the Palestinian
people have that their state both can and will protect them, first and foremost,
from the threat of internal and external violence, but also from the economic
and social forces that ravish their sense of well-being. While the sense of
security that Palestinians seek cannot be separated from the quality of their
police force, it cannot be reduced to this either. It is obviously intertwined with
the concerns that have been raised about permeable borders and territorial con-
tiguity. At the same time, it must be noted that the sense of security that Israe-
lis seek cannot be derived solely from the effectiveness of their defense forces
either and cannot be separated from the choices they make about the borders
and territory that they allot the Palestinians. As noted above, harsh measures
taken to thwart immediate security threats and risks often undermine the very
protection that is the ultimate goal.
In short, decisions made and actions taken with regard to any of the three
key issues highlighted in the Rand report necessarily depend upon, and neces-
sarily exert an influence on, the other issues. That influence, in turn, can be
positive or negative. If contiguity of territory results in violence or threats that
diminish Israeli feelings of security, the goal of permeability of borders will not
be met. If permeable borders results in similar violence or threats, the goal of
contiguous territory will not be met. If, on the other hand, territorial contiguity
and permeable borders are achieved in a manner that enhances rather than
diminishes Israeli feelings of security, then the process is likely to unfold in a
matter that serves other Palestinian interests as well.
Clearly, from the perspective of both sides, the option of open borders and
contiguous territory holds open the promise of viability-if it can be achieved
in a manner that is consistent with mutual human security. No doubt, this
option contains formidable risks; and, if the challenges of good governance,
enhanced security, positive economic performance, and increased standard of
living are not adequately met, both the Palestinian and Israeli people have left
themselves vulnerable to increased violence and social and political chaos. But
the negative scenario of a state consisting of separated enclaves, hemmed in by
closed borders, facing a future of periodic Israeli military invasions to deal with
"terrorist" threats offers no prospects for either peace or viability. It will most
certainly encounter a Palestinian reaction that will include violent confronta-
tion, organized armed resistance, massive resentment, and little hope for Pales-
14 Martin Van Creveld writes:
The most important single demand that any political community must meet is the demand for
protection. A community which cannot safeguard the lives of its members, subjects, citizens,
comrades, brothers, or whatever they are called is unlikely either to command their loyalty or to
survive for very long. The opposite is also correct: any community able and, more importantly,
willing to exert itself to protect its members will be able to call on those members 's loyalty even
to the point where they are prepared to die for it.
MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATnON OF WAR 198 (1991).
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tinians to enjoy a better life. This scenario, of course, is negative for Israelis as
well as Palestinians, but, again, we would argue, more negative and less beara-
ble for the already beleaguered Palestinians. For those who seek to avoid this
scenario, the immediate imperative must be, first, to create the trust and mutual
confidence necessary to make the people and leadership in both societies strive
to achieve the more positive scenario and, second, to make sure that the initial
steps taken in the direction of this more positive scenario produce the type of
viable Palestinian state that can offer such benefits to its citizenry.'
5
II. COORDINATED RECIPROCAL UNILATERAL ACTION
For peace to have a real chance, the Israelis and Palestinians must create
the relationships that make possible permeable borders, contiguous Palestinian
territory, and a high level of human security for both Palestinians and Israelis.
If this is the foremost goal, then a speedy return to the negotiation table in
pursuit of a comprehensive bilateral agreement may not be the most effective
strategy. We reach this conclusion-which no doubt will be unwelcome to
supporters of the peace process on both sides-because the current political
climate makes unlikely the difficult trade of concessions that would be needed
to move toward these goals. To make real headway, the Palestinians must sig-
nal their willingness to relinquish the right of Palestinian refugees to return to
home within Israel-or, at least, their acceptance of the fact that they will not
be able to exercise this right. Israelis, for their part, must signal their willing-
ness to accept the principle of a return to the '67 borders (with any incorpora-
tion of previous Palestinian territories compensated by a mutually acceptable
exchange of Israeli territories) and also the establishment of a Palestinian capi-
tal in East Jerusalem.
Given the current levels of distrust and, perhaps equally important, the
current realities of both Israeli and Palestinian politics, the prospects of either
side sending these signals seem very dim indeed. Israelis have little trust that
their concessions would bring a real end to the conflict and an end to all future
claims on the part of the Palestinians. Likewise, Palestinians have little trust
that their concessions would produce an end to Israeli domination and the ful-
fillment of their own social, economic, and political goals. Without a signifi-
cant shift in this political landscape, it is hard to see how the negotiation table
will provide anything more than a platform for the parties to rehash their well-
worn arguments about who is responsible for the deadlock and to demand once
again that the other side take the initiative in breaking it. Each will feel justi-
fied in going slow, offering its own concessions only in response to other side's
complete and successful implementation of its obligations. 6
'1 To anticipate our argument, the strategy that unfolds from these two objectives will
require a reciprocal unilateral process that leads to the establishment of a viable Palestinian
state. For some indication of what this process might look like, see Walid Salem's four part
series on post-disengagement. Walid Salem, Series on Post-Disengagement Issues (Sept 1,
2005 through January 19, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author, Walid Salem).
16 Concerning the Roadmap, Gershon Baskin, co-director of the Israel/Palestine Center for
Research and Information ("IPCRI"), argues that we will simply return to standard argu-
ments over it implementation.
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The problem, it is easy to see, is that both sides have very legitimate rea-
son to distrust the other. The current Likud government is skeptical that the
Palestinian leadership is interested in taking the difficult steps that most Israelis
would demand as the price for relinquishing West Bank territories with signifi-
cant Israeli settlements. Even those Israelis who would be willing to pay a
heavy price for peace have grave doubts about the current Palestinian leader-
ship's ability to uphold its end of any peace agreement. On the other hand,
Palestinian leaders have, with good reason, voiced deep concerns about
whether Ariel Sharon would be willing to entertain any plan that they and the
Palestinian "street" would find even minimally acceptable. They believe that
his goal is to impose terms that are more acceptable to most Israelis than any-
thing he is likely to get through a negotiated settlement.
We believe, however, that the problem goes deeper than distrust about the
intentions of current political leaders. For trust to replace that distrust, each
side must believe that, come what may, the other side genuinely seeks a mutu-
ally acceptable agreement and that it is committed to honoring it. The Pales-
tinians must believe that the negotiation process will truly result in a viable
Palestinian state. The Israelis must believe that an agreement with the Pales-
tinians Authority ("PA") will truly deliver them the long-term security that they
have sought for so long. Seeking detailed agreements about the central issues
under dispute-no matter how clearly those details are spelled out-cannot
substitute for a lack of trust in this regard. Indeed, the ability to spell out the
details of a possible settlement has not been the real problem anyway. In fact,
we would argue the central issues have already been over-negotiated. Neither
Palestinians nor Israelis are going to take comfort in the finer points of an
agreement when, irrespective of what is written on paper, they basically don't
find each other trustworthy. Given the existing level of skepticism and suspi-
cion, launching a new round of negotiations in the hope that it will lay the
foundation for future trust seems doomed from the start. 17 Indeed, there is a
real danger that this strategy will achieve the opposite result since history tells
us that unsuccessful and unfruitful negotiation generally undermines whatever
First, the Palestinians and the Quartet will state that the implementation must be in parallel,
while Israel will claim it must be sequential-meaning that first the Palestinians must dismantle
the infrastructure of terrorism and only then Israel will freeze settlements. The Palestinians will
claim they have completed their Phase I obligations, while Israel will claim that on the overrid-
ing issue of terrorism they have not even begun.
The Palestinians will demand moving immediately to Phase I1-or permanent status negotia-
tions. The US and Israel will demand that only after Phase I is complete can we move to the
creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, as called for in the road map. The Pales-
tinians will indicate that the road map speaks of this only as an option, and that they reject this
option.
The Palestinians don't want another interim agreement that will take another 10 years. That is
precisely what Prime Minister Ariel Sharon wants. The road map calls for the Quartet to moni-
tor the process, but they never created a monitoring mechanism.
Gershon Baskin, Looking Beyond Disengagement, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 9, 2005, at 15.
17 There are several well-documented psychological processes (such as loss aversion, biased
assimilation of information, and reactance that leads to devaluation of proposed trades of
concessions) that present challenges or barriers to effective negotiation in the normal sense
of the term. See Lee Ross, The Reactive Devaluation Barrier in Dispute Resolution, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 30 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
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trust had existed and weakens the hand of those who have recommended this
path.
These political realities have left those who would like to move the peace
process forward feeling-to use an American metaphor-"caught between a
rock and a hard place." While no agreement is possible without negotiation,
negotiation at this time may make agreement more difficult rather than less
difficult to achieve. In light of this state of affairs, it is instructive to consider
the current maneuverings of Prime Minister Sharon. Claiming that Israel has
no reliable Palestinian partner, and believing (no doubt correctly) that a final
agreement acceptable both to his political allies and to the Palestinians is
unreachable, Sharon has launched a policy of unilateral disengagement that he
defends as furthering Israel's self-interest. 8 He does not hesitate to acknowl-
edge that he will undertake actions that are designed to benefit Israel (some of
which may be welcome to many Palestinians while others will be unwelcome
to virtually all Palestinians) and that he will do so with or without Palestinian
concurrence. He makes it clear that he is concerned only with Israeli interests
and not with any impact, positive or negative, on Palestinian interests. Such a
policy, he reckons, will allow Israelis to unite around the politically popular
goals of maintaining Jerusalem as an exclusively Israeli capital, retaining large
Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and at the same time guaranteeing the
continuation of the "Jewish character" of the state. 9
While it is very doubtful that Sharon's current brand of unilateralism lays
a solid foundation for future peace, it is important-given that bilateralism
holds little immediate prospect for peace either-to ask what alternatives
exist?2 ° This is the question we turn to next. Our starting point is the conten-
'8 Addressing The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum, Zalman Shoval, a promi-
nent Likud politician and former ambassador to the United States, explained that Israelis had
adopted a strategy of unilateral action both because there was no reliable Palestinian partner
and because there was no formula for producing a final agreement that was acceptable to
both sides. The Washington Institute, Sharon's Disengagement Plan: A Likud Perpective,
June 14, 2004, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2153. Although
Shoval doesn't explicitly say so, the gist of his comments is that Palestinians need to accept
that there will be no right of return to Israel proper and to endorse an Israeli interpretation of
UN Security Resolution 242 that allows Israel to keep the territory on which it has built most
of its settlements and that it deems necessarily for its own security.
19 In his speech to the Herzliya Conference, Ariel Sharon stated that his disengagement
policy had allowed Israelis to unite around Israel's real goals concerning Jerusalem, the large
settlement, and the Jewish character of the state. Moreover, it had created an understanding
with President Bush that would allow Israel to keep its large settlement bloc, to resist pres-
sured to return to the '67 borders, and to refuse outright to allow Palestinian refugees to
resettle in Israel. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Speech at the Herzliya Conference (Dec. 16,
2004), http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Speeches/2004/12/speechl61204.htm.
20 We note again that beyond these political considerations, there are psychological consid-
erations that lead us, in certain circumstances, to favor unilateral actions that build trust and
invite reciprocation over bilateral negotiations designed to produce agreements about trades
of concessions. In particular, decision-makers are reluctant to part with an asset or opportu-
nity that they already possess in order to gain an asset or opportunity of seemingly equal or
even greater value that they would like to possess. DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY,
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1-16, 17-43, 269-87 (2000); see generally Richard Thaler,
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, I J. oF EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980).
The relevance of this bias is twofold. First, it makes parties reluctant to accept proposals that
call upon it to accept losses in order to achieve gains-particularly gains that are uncertain
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tion that it is sometimes easier to make a particular concession unilaterally on
the grounds of self-interest than to make the same concession in the context of
bilateral negotiation in which each side must defend itself against the charge
that its own concessions were not matched with concessions of equal value and
significance by the other side.
In an insightful paper entitled "Arms Control without Treaties?"'" George
Bunn and David Holloway explored the possibility of using unilateral acts-
acts that are not dictated by any formal agreement, but that are reciprocal in
nature-as an alternative to the conventional mechanism of negotiated trea-
ties.2 2 The authors' primary concern was the means by which the Soviet Union
and the U.S. might be able reduce their post-Cold War nuclear arsenals at a
time when the traditional approach of engaging in long negotiations to produce
meticulously detailed treaties was stalled. While the stalemate was due to sev-
eral factors, most notably the backbreaking process of formal ratification, the
net result was an inability to move the arms control process forward at a time
when both sides had a clear and compelling interest in reaching an agreement.
Drawing on the earlier work of Alexander George on U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions, 3 Bunn and Holloway differentiate between strategies of bargaining and
strategies of reciprocity. 4 Whereas bargaining entails negotiations that seek
specifically agreed upon concessions and compromises (usually explicit and
formal in nature), reciprocity involves unilateral undertakings, albeit ones
designed to encourage the other side to respond in kind. While bargaining is
designed to produce treaties, the reciprocity strategy relies on less formal
arrangements arising from cooperative interactions and communications about
mutually desirable goals and intentions. The reciprocal steps that it envisions
both reflect the existence of productive working relationships and serve to build
greater trust about the future. Furthermore, because they are implemented uni-
laterally in the conviction that each side's steps serve its own interest, they do
not require official legislative ratification and can bypass the political infighting
that accompanies the ratification process.
and are to be achieved only in the future. Second, once parties are enjoying some new
benefits with which they have been "endowed" they become reluctant to engage in behavior
that puts their gains at risk. Unilateral actions can offer such endowments to the other side
and prompt reciprocal actions to preserve that endowment.
21 George Bunn & David Holloway, Arms Control without Treaties? (Ctr. for Int'l Security
and Arms Control, Working Paper, 1998), http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/1021 l/rum.pdf.
22 Bunn and Holloway use the acronym R.U.M.s (reciprocal unilateral moves) to cover the
three types of reciprocity-GRIT, tit-for-tat, and conditional reciprocity-they explore. Tit-
for-tat plays a very minor role in their analysis. Moreover, they note that "Quantitative
studies of GRIT and tit-for-tat have suggested that GRIT has been much more effective than
tit-for-tat . I..." d. at 9. Tit-for-tat has very limited relevance for our purpose except per-
haps to suggest why an exchange of mutual concessions by itself might have building trust.
In this light, we have chosen to bypass it.
23 ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, U.S.-SOVIET SECURITY COOPERATION: ACHIEVEMENTS, FAIL-
URES, LESSONS (Alexander L. George et al. eds., 1988).
24 See generally Bunn & Holloway, supra note 21.
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From their survey of Cold War history, Bunn and Holloway conclude that
coordinated reciprocal unilateral actions are capable of producing incremental
steps that can lead to informal agreements that only later are codified into for-
mal treaties.25 They also draw several important lessons that have relevance to
our concern with trust-building in the context of the Middle East search for a
two-state solution.26 They first note that "nothing in the practice of reciprocity
... necessarily precludes bargaining."2 7 In fact, certain other features of nor-
mal bargaining may improve the overall chances of success. Indeed, the
authors suggest the most successful unilateral strategy has featured a condi-
tional component-that is, prior consultation in which one's initial action is
made contingent on the explicit or implicit promise of a specified response
from the other side. 28 This approach addresses directly problems of uncertainty
by making clear what the initiator expects in return and thus establishes the
standard by which the other side's response will be judged. It also counteracts
the tendency for the other side to simply "pocket" the benefits without respond-
ing with a comparable offer. By demonstrating that unilateral actions can be
coordinated around common interests, conditional reciprocity can help the par-
ties-as it did with the U.S. and Soviet Union-to reach greater agreement and,
as a result, to improve their overall relationship.
Bunn and Holloway caution, however, that conditional reciprocity may
have a limited effect on changing the "enemy images" that fuel the conflict.29
Agreements that are based solely on each side's perception and pursuit of its
own self-interest do not necessarily lend themselves to dealing with critical
issues on which the parties do not share a common interest. In this regard, the
GRIT (or "Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction") strategy advocated
in the 1960s by Charles Osgood may prove to be more useful.3 ° With GRIT,
one side undertakes a move whose expressed purpose and principal intention is
to reduce the distrust of the other side. The other side is then invited to respond
in kind, but no attempt is made to specify exactly what this response should be.
Thus, with GRIT, gestures are not made contingent on how the other side
reacts, although the message is clearly given that some appropriate reciproca-
tion will be necessary if any future action is to be forthcoming.3 1 Ideally, the
first move by one party is followed by a reciprocal move by the other side and
25 Id. at 22.
26 Id. at 19-20.
27 Id. at 4.
28 Id. at 9
29 Id. at 20.
30 See generally CHARLES E. OsGOOD, AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER (1963).
31 While GRIT, like other forms of unilateral moves undertaken to produce a cycle of recip-
rocated concessions, can be effective, there is a particular psychological process that can
compromise its effectiveness. This process involves "reactance." JACK W. BREHM &
SHARON S. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL
(1981); LEE Ross, REACTIVE DEVALUATION (1993). The reactive devaluation barrier in dis-
pute resolution whereby the act of offering a concession decreases its perceived value and
significance in the eyes of the recipient. BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note
17, at 30-48. In the absence of prior discussion and the building of a minimal level of trust
about future intentions, parties are apt to see unilateral concessions as token or deceptive or,
at least, as being of little significance to the party offering the concession. Expressing such
sentiments, of course, diminishes trust and leads the parties to doubt each other's sincerity.
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similar invitation to respond. As this process continues, it will produce a
decline in tension and an increase in trust that leads to the preconditions for
successful formal negotiations and ultimately an end to the conflict.
3 2
The essential difference between conditional reciprocity and GRIT lies in
the different situations they are designed to address. GRIT was proposed as a
way to use unsolicited gestures to signal a willingness to pursue common inter-
ests to an adversary who has heretofore seen the conflict in zero-sum terms. It
invites the other side to give recognition to these points of commonality by
responding in kind. Conditional reciprocity, by contrast, seeks to build upon
the common interests that the parties have already both acknowledged. It sim-
ply calls for the coordination of the relevant (presumably alternating) moves
around the mutually recognized expectations of both sides. Our proposal here
is to combine these two strategies, taking the strong points of each. Since the
limitation of conditional reciprocity lies in expanding this initial domain of
common interests beyond what the parties have already recognized, the further-
ance of the peace process demands that one or both parties supplement these
reciprocal exchanges with unsolicited moves designed to underscore new
points of potential, as yet unrecognized, common interests (as in GRIT). For
instance, unilateral Israeli initiatives designed to increase human security for
Palestinians and/or unilateral Palestinian initiatives designed to increase Israeli
security from suicide bombers would contribute to the building of trust about
future intentions, and at the same time each initiative would serve the interests
of the initiator as well as those of the other side.
IV. BUILDING TRUST: THE IMPORTANCE OF A VISION OF AN
ACCEPTABLE "SHARED FUTURE"
Discussions of trust often focus on the value that the individuals or parties
place on fulfilling each other's expectations and on preserving a mutually bene-
ficial relationship. By contrast, we join Russell Hardin in maintaining that trust
has to do with a "rational expectation about the self-interested behavior" that
can be expected from the other person or party.33 To say that I trust you means
that I have grounds for thinking that you will be trustworthy.34 These grounds
have to do with the way that my interests and yours are related; namely, that I
think it is in your interests to take my interests into account when you act. I
trust you to recognize this fact and act accordingly-and on that basis I believe
you are and will continue to be trustworthy. In other words, I trust you to the
extent that I believe my interests are encapsulated within yours and that you, as
a rational human being, will therefore give appropriate weight to my interests
Avoiding or overcoming reactive devaluation, accordingly, is an important task for the par-
ties hoping to use GRIT.
32 Political scientists are apt to disagree about the "track record" of GRIT. Also, one might
well argue that if the relationships needed to make GRIT work are in place, it is the relation-
ships and not GRIT per se that account for the parties' success in working together. Indeed,
if such relationships are in place, it is clear why GRIT would be needed. Still, acknowledg-
ment that dispelling distrust is apt to require something beyond the taking of unilateral, self-
interested steps or even the coordination of steps that are of mutual self-interest, is important.
31 See RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 6 (2002).
34 Id. at 1.
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as you pursue your own. It should be emphasized that trust of the sort
described here is not based on the belief that we have identical or even compat-
ible interests.35 Rather, it is grounded in my assessment that your self-interest
entails making sure that my interests are impacted in a positive way (or at least
not impacted in an overly negative way).
This notion of trust as encapsulated interest is closely related to what we
have called the shared futures question, which we regard as so central to the
achievement of genuine peace as opposed to cessation of hostilities that we
sometimes term it simply the peace question.36 This question challenges each
party to articulate a vision of the future that includes a place for the other that
they will judge to be minimally "bearable." In all likelihood, this place will be
less than what they sought, and it will, almost certainly, offer less than what
they feel is their just due. Nevertheless, it is a place that offers an everyday life
for one's family and immediate community that one could live with. Unless a
place for the other is envisioned and credibly communicated, all negotiation-
as well as any other attempt to define mutual interests with regard to particular
issues-cannot be expected to bear fruit. In other words, I must feel that a
bearable future for me is encapsulated within the future you are pursuing, and
you must feel the same about the future that I am pursuing.3 7
We emphasize the importance of credible communication because each
side must believe that the other side's articulated version of the future corre-
sponds to their real intentions rather than to a way station in the struggle to
achieve its "real," longer term objectives. Each side's uncertainty concerning
the other's real intentions, in turn, will again reflect perceptions of interest-
based trustworthiness. In this regard, Hardin argues that trust is always a three-
part relation.38 Again, he emphasizes that I don't trust you in a general or
abstract way, but instead trust you with respect to a particular action in a partic-
ular context. I trust you to do X (but not necessarily to do or refrain from doing
Y) and to do X in situations A, B, and C (but not necessarily to do so in
situation D).39 I recognize that if the context shifts or our interactions change, I
may need to reconsider the trust I previously invested in you. Trust is always
limited to certain actions contingent on certain conditions, and these actions
and conditions constitute a domain of trustworthiness. Parties establish their
35 Id. at 4-5.
36 Byron Bland et al., Building a Peace Constituency: The Achievement and Implementa-
tion of a Peace Agreement in the Middle East, in 3 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RESOLVING
GLOBAL CONFLICTS 123, 136-37 (Mari Fitzduff & Chris E. Stout eds., 2005); Byron Bland,
Beyond Cheap Talk: Fruitful Dialogue and Building Productive Working Relationships,
Stanford Ctr. on Int'l Conflict and Negotiation, Oct. 2004, http://www.stanford.edu/group/
sccn/Final Cheap Talkl0-l.htm; Byron Bland, Creating a Political Language For Peace:
Grassroots Dialogue Within a Peace Process, Ctr. on Int'l Conflict and Negotiation, http://
www.stanford.edu/group/sccn/CD-SCCN Peace.htm.
37 Although peace cannot come about unless the parties address the shared future question
to each other's satisfaction, real peace will require more. Both sides must also feel that a
shared future is better for them than what they are likely to achieve through a continuation of
the conflict. Moreover, each side must believe that this is true for the other side too or else it
will anticipate that the other side will reinitiate the conflict at a time and under circumstances
of its own choosing.




trustworthiness by demonstrating to the other side that they will honor their
commitment to act in this manner.
In summary, a strategy for building trust must (1) establish the foundation
for trust in the vision of a shared future, (2) validate the trustworthiness of the
parties, and (3) seek to expand the domain of trustworthiness. The settlement
outlined at the beginning of this paper offers a view of a shared future that we
believe is the only one that majorities of Israelis and Palestinians might find
bearable and thus minimally acceptable. What remains are the difficult tasks of
validating trustworthiness and expanding its domain. This task involves each
side proving to the other side-by deeds as well as words-that it understands
the encapsulated nature of the other side's interests within their own, and vice
versa.4n Independent self-interested action that also promotes the interest of the
other side speaks for itself in a way that negotiated concessions, encumbered
tradeoffs and coercive tactics, cannot. Still, by itself, this form of unilateral
action is not enough. The parties must further demonstrate that the encapsu-
lated nature of their own interests causes them to place value on the relation-
ship itself.
V. DEVELOPING A STRATEGY
It is time to put the various pieces of our analysis together and to pursue
its implications. The immediate task at hand is that of developing a strategy to
create the trust and mutual confidence required for the parties to move forward
on the journey to a viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace with
Israel. Palestinians must be made confident that the difficult actions they
undertake will, in fact, move toward the permeability of borders, contiguity of
territory, and human security and dignity that make for a viable state. Israelis,
in turn, must be made confident that these Palestinian achievements will also
serve the main interests of its citizens-that is, a true end to the Middle East
conflict and the opportunity for them to live secure normal lives, not only in the
immediate future, but for all of the foreseeable future as well. This confidence,
we have argued, will grow from concrete demonstrations by each side that it
recognizes how the other side's interests are encapsulated within its own pur-
suit of self-interest, and vice versa. We have further argued that unilateral
steps-coordinated whenever possible-are the means to provide this demon-
stration. In a sense, the formula in question is simple and obvious. It calls
upon each side to take the confidence building steps of mutual interest that it
can take on its own and, where the other side's cooperation is required, to
consider what it can do to remove whatever political, strategic, or psychologi-
cal barriers stand in the way of this cooperation.
40 Nowhere is this requirement more evident than in the problem of dealing with "spoilers,"
that is factions who do not see a place for themselves in any future achievable by non-
coercive means that is both bearable and preferable to that achievable by other means. Ste-
phen J. Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 5, 17-
35. Such unilateral actions can of course involve suppression of the groups in question; but
it can also involve a willingness not to demand such suppression prematurely, that is, before
it is politically possible to do so, and/or before the possibility of persuading the spoilers that
the future will hold a bearable place for them.
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In a recent article for the Jerusalem Post, Gershon Baskin, co-director of
the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information ("IPCRI"), proposed
the kind of strategy we are advocating. 4' Like most observers, he believes that
a bilateral negotiated process will be required at some point, but that current
levels of distrust make a return to the negotiation table at any time in the fore-
seeable future unlikely.42 The only realistic option left, he argues, is to con-
tinue with the unilateral approach that Israel has adopted. He has since joined
with Hana Siniora, the Palestinian co-director of IPCRI, to issue a six-point
peace plan that stipulates the coordinated unilateral steps intended to ensure
that "Gaza first" does not become "Gaza only."4 3
The first requirement is to make Gaza a success. This will entail (1)
improving economic prospects for the people of Gaza, (2) establishing rule of
law, (3) enhancing the private sector, (4) increasing water resources, and (5)
exploiting natural gas reserves. Responsibility for making progress in these
areas will rest primarily on the shoulders of the Palestinians, but success will
also require Israeli (as well as international) collaboration and assistance. From
our point of view, this first phase offers an excellent opportunity for both sides
to demonstrate their commitment to building a viable Palestinian state that
would live in peace with Israel, and thereby to lay the foundation for trust that
will be sorely needed later as the process continues.
The next step would involve a second Israeli disengagement from those
settlements east of the security barrier. This would require the evacuation of
about 56,000 Israelis in eighty settlements, but would not include Maale
Adumim, whose status would presumably be determined later in talks about
Jerusalem. This territory would then be fully turned over to the Palestinians,
who would now control Gaza and about eighty percent of the West Bank. In
effect, this move, along with trilateral interim arrangements with Jordon con-
cerning security, would give birth to a Palestinian state. Baskin and Siniora
emphasize, however, that full peace will not come about as long as the main
41 Gershon Baskin, Looking Beyond Disengagement, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 9, 2005, at 15.
42 Id. In specific terms, this means that Israel must follow the first disengagement from
Gaza with a second and third and possible even a fourth phase of disengagement. Although
Baskin offers no details about the third and fourth phases, he is clear that the second stage of
disengagement should include all settlements east of the separation barrier. Regarding the
Palestinians, he suggests that they should first do everything they can to ensure that the Gaza
disengagement goes smoothly. He further suggests that they should also begin coordinating
with Israel so that the second and third phases are not seen as a victory for Hamas and that
the Palestinian Authority will be in a position to take control over any territories that Israel
vacates. He proposes that they reaffirm their declaration of statehood within the 1967 bor-
ders and with East Jerusalem as the capital in a public forum, and finally that they should ask
the UN to grant full membership rights and invite the nations of the world to establish
temporary embassies in East Jerusalem. Baskin also suggests that the international commu-
nity, for its part, should improve its monitoring and verification capabilities and that the
United States should clarify and elaborate its vision of a two states solution-perhaps in a
public declaration of principles and a letter of guarantees to Mr. Abbas similar to President
Bush's letter to Mr. Sharon.
43 Gershon Baskin & Hana Siniora, The Baskin-Siniora Peace Plan: Creating the Two




permanent status issues-final borders, Jerusalem, and refugees-remain
unresolved. But they argue that the initial steps they have outlined will create
conditions that make the resolution of these outstanding issues more likely.
The remaining four points of their plan address making Jerusalem the capital of
both states, launching environmental initiatives, creating a culture of peace, and
reaching agreement on permanent status issues. Each of these would follow
and build upon progress made in the first two steps, which is obviously the
meat of their proposal.
Given Israeli public opinion, the proposal put forward by Baskin and Sini-
ora is a bold one that pushes the envelope of Sharon's unilateralism far beyond
the initial Gaza disengagement. Nevertheless, for the first time, Jews no longer
constitute a majority in the lands they now control,' and it is clearly in Israel's
self-interest to enact a second disengagement of the kind advocated by Baskin
and Siniora. Still, moving beyond this will be possible only if the questions of
trust and confidence that we have emphasized are effectively addressed by the
two sides. Otherwise, it is hard to see Israeli public opinion backing steps that
do more than evacuate territories with large Palestinian majorities.
Indeed, there is every reason to think that Sharon's unilateral disengage-
ment could stop at precisely this point. Having withdrawn from the heavily
populated Palestinian areas of the West Bank, he would be in a strategic and
political position where he could seal the borders and station the Israel Defense
Force to maintain Israeli security, if necessary, through incursions into Palestin-
ian territory. In fact, he would have accomplished his well-understood goal to
disengage from any negotiation or dialogue with the Palestinians, leaving it for
them to make (or more likely not make) their state viable, while leaving Israel
with maximum control over future events. His message to the Palestinians
would be to create whatever permeable borders, contiguous territory, and secur-
ity institutions they wanted-but to do so with Jordan and Egypt, not Israel.45
We have now come full circle to the fundamental asymmetry with which
we began this paper. If Sharon's policies, which reflect the views of many
Israelis who have grown increasingly distrustful of Palestinian intention, result
in a second disengagement of the kind described above, Israelis will be left
facing a future that, despite a continuing threat from resentful and desperate
Palestinians and despite some forfeiting of economic opportunities, they could
bear reasonably well. Palestinians, on the other hand, would face a future that
they would find neither bearable nor acceptable. If Israel chooses unilateral
disengagement of the sort Sharon probably envisions, it will have defacto cho'-
" Amiram Barkat, For First Time, Jews are No Longer a Majority Between the Jordan and
the Sea, Seminar at Stanford University (Aug. 11, 2005), http://www.stanford.edu/dept/EIS/
lecturestanner_04_05 .html.
41 Several scholars have begun considering the role that Jordan might play in helping to
make the Palestinian state more viable. See Joseph Braude, Good Neighbor: How Jordan
Can Help Palestine, The New Republic Online (Aug. 30, 2005), http://www.tnr.com/doc
print.mhtml?i=w050829&s=braudeO83005; Gary Sussman, Ariel Sharon and the Jordan




sen to deal with a failed Palestinian state by minimizing the negative conse-
quences to its own citizens. Palestinians, in turn, would have little reason to do
anything to make these consequences less harmful to Israel. For they would
take Israeli actions to be what they are-actions, taken without regard to Israeli
well-being, that maximize Israeli self-interest at the cost of denying Palestini-
ans a state.46
Given the all-too-plausible nature of this bleak scenario, the critical ques-
tion facing Palestinians (as well as Israelis and Americans or others who have
any concern for their welfare) is how to change it. A way must be found to
move the disengagement process onto a track that leads toward permeable bor-
ders, contiguous territory, and human security for both Israelis and Palestinians.
To do this, several more proximal goals must be pursued. First, a way must be
found to move the center of Israeli political opinion to resist the complacency
that is sure to come after the second disengagement. Many Israelis will want to
feel that they have done enough, that nothing more is possible anyway, and that
in any case it is now time for the Palestinians to show their willingness to take
the kind of steps that many Israelis agree are necessary for better relations-
disarming militant groups, ending anti-Israeli rhetoric, curbing corruption that
robs Palestinians of any peace dividend. In any case, Palestinians must find a
way to build Israeli support for further steps along a path that ends in a viable
state for them. No less importantly, Palestinians must prepare their own popu-
lation to back the actions needed to move the Israeli public in this direction.
Needless to say, none of this will be easy. At the risk of repeating our-
selves once too often, we say again that the building of trust is the key to the
task that lies ahead. Palestinians must communicate in plain language a vision
of the future that Israelis-or at least the peace-seeking Israelis who could
command the political center-would find acceptable. They must then demon-
strate this commitment as concretely, indeed as dramatically, as possible
through their words and deeds. Public assurances that the majority of Palestini-
ans seek a "just two-state solution" will not be enough, so long as Israelis
think-justifiably or unjustifiably-that the kind of solution that Palestinians
envision is one that will not guarantee long-term Israeli security. Even peace-
seeking Israelis want to hear something new and to see things done that have
not been done before-something that signals a change in attitudes and aspira-
tions. Secondly, Palestinians must create confidence that the difficult actions
they ask their community to undertake will result in a state that offers its citi-
zens a reasonable degree of opportunity, prosperity, security, and dignity. As
we have emphasized, this cannot be accomplished without Israeli coopera-
46 In a recent editorial, the New York Times stated:
Unfortunately, Mr. Sharon seems to think that withdrawing from Gaza will buy Israel time to
spend to consolidate in the West Bank. Even the pro-withdrawal officials in Mr. Sharon's hard-
line Likud Party maintain that Gaza is not the beginning, but rather the end. Mr. Sharon's own
chief political strategist has said that a central purpose of the Gaza withdrawal plan was to take
Palestinian statehood off the table indefinitely. The belief appears to be that by "giving" Presi-
dent Bush Gaza, Israel will have bought for itself at least a lack of American pressure so that it
can remain in the West Bank.
Editorial, Only the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, at A16.
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tion-which is the reason why satisfying Israelis that this state intends to live
in peace with Israel for generations to come is essential.
Palestinians may feel that this approach places an unfair share of the bur-
den on their shoulders. They may claim that it implicitly blames the victims for
the difficult plight they face. Right-wing Israelis will certainly argue that the
approach we have outlined assigns too little blame to Palestinians and does too
little to satisfy their security needs or their vision for the Middle East. To our
mind, this debate is pointless. We feel that another course of discernment and
action is needed and would ultimately prove more productive. The strategy we
advocate unfolds in five steps, the first three of which should be implemented
in parallel Palestinian and Israeli tracks.
A. Laying the foundation for trust
Both Palestinians and Israelis of goodwill must start with an explicit and
public commitment to the principles of settlement with which we began this
paper. Polls have consistently indicated that a majority of both Israelis and
Palestinians would accept this outcome, albeit in many cases reluctantly, if they
thought that the other side intended to live within its provisions and, particu-
larly for the Israelis, agreed to end the conflict once and for all. There are
several proposals for a final settlement currently circulating among the peace
camps of both sides, each more or less prescribing the principles that we have
laid out. Efforts to reconcile the wording or even the content of these versions
to produce a single agreed upon document are not particularly valuable since,
as we have argued, the problem is less perfecting the document than distrusting
intentions to comply. These plans seek to articulate a future that is mutually
acceptable-not in the sense that they necessarily agree on a particular vision
but in the sense that both feel that, if the other side's vision came about, they
could live with it. As we have argued, the trust needed to reach and implement
a settlement must be grounded in the mutually acceptable visions of a shared
future that the two societies have. The baseline for both Palestinians and Israe-
lis is that the future-whatever it might be-offers them secure, normal lives
within a secure, stable state.
B. Establishing trustworthiness
The settlement that we have outlined will produce peace only if a viable
Palestinian state emerges in the process. We have argued that, at least at the
present time, the best way to move forward towards the creation of a viable
Palestinian state is not negotiation but coordinated unilateral action. Each side
must discern what it can do by itself, without the assistance of anyone else, to
move beyond the second disengagement toward the conditions that the RAND
study identifies for viability-permeable borders, contiguous territory, and
human security for Palestinians and Israelis.4 7 Some of these actions will focus
on goals that must be addressed separately, distinct from any action undertaken
by the other side. Other actions will target goals that require some measure of
coordination or, at least, conversation. The critical point in either case is that
" See generally THE RAND PALESTINIAN STATE STUDY TEAM, supra note 5.
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those concerned have the ability and the will to undertake these ventures in the
current political climate and at the present moment.
C. Broadening the domain of trustworthiness
Palestinians and Israelis must next identify goals for which they currently
do not have the capacity to achieve alone and, therefore, need the support and
assistance of some other partner. They must then determine how to use the
things they can do to build the partnerships they need to do the things they
can't do. Besides each other, these partners may be third-party international
actors (U.S., EU, UN, the Quartet, Arab League), regional actors (Jordan,
Egypt) or rival internal domestic factions.
The next two steps will call for greater measures of collaboration between
the Palestinians and Israelis. The parties should not abandon the parallel tracks
of steps one through three, but they will need to begin engaging each other in
more serious and intentional dialogue.
D. Establishing reciprocity
The Palestinians and Israelis should now have in-hand two plans of action
that they can launch unilaterally; and the next task will be to put these two
together, aligning and meshing them wherever and whenever possible. Some
of the actions that each has identified may conflict with what the other side is
planning. Sometimes, the activities of one side may be made easier if comple-
mentary action by the other side either precedes or follows a particular event.
The goal here is to make each strategy more effective.
E. Rectifying injustice
We acknowledged at the outset that any settlement having a realistic
chance of being enacted will leave both sides feeling disgruntled. Most of their
objections will center on what they consider to be the failure of the settlement
to provide the justice they feel they deserve. The desire for justice rather than a
mere advance of the status quo is a universal human attribute, as is the ten-
dency for the parties in a dispute to have very different notions of what would
be just in light of the relevant bases for claims and history of the disagreement.
Palestinians and Israelis are no different in this regard. We have written else-
where about the unavoidable problems that the pursuit of justice poses for those
seeking a settlement, and the constraints of this paper do not allow us to go into
them in any detail here.4 8 Let us simply state that the existential question that
each of us faces in our daily lives is not really whether a particular settlement-
or in most cases, the political status quo-is just or not. Instead, we face a
decision about whether the departures from justice that we suffer in the inter-
ests of preserving peaceful and harmonious relationships are worth that price.
We do not deny that the weight of such a decision rests much more heavily on
some than others-especially those Palestinians who collectively have suffered
so much injustice, but also on many Israelis who will now be asked to leave
their homes, or see the loss of their loved ones go unpunished, just as so many
48 See Bland et al., supra note 36.
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Palestinians did before them. As a final act and as a tribute to feelings of those
who have suffered most, we encourage both Palestinians and Israelis to come
together in serious and extended dialogue to ask themselves whether there is
any way, given that true justice cannot be achieved for all, that they might
lessen the injustices and sense of loss that their actions impose upon each
other.4 9
49 The philosopher Avishai Margalit has written eloquently about the need to achieve a
peace that is non-humiliating to Palestinians and the need for all concerned to abandon the
unreachable goal of achieving something that the parties would see as just in favor of the
more modest goal of reducing what all concerned recognize to be injustice. See AvIsHAI
MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996); see also Avishai Mar-
galit, Is Peace and Justice Like Fish and Chips?, Seminar at Stanford University Center on
Conflict and Negotiation (Feb. 11, 2003), http://www.stanford.edu/group/sccn/general/031D
Seminar.htm. He invites us to pose the problem in the Middle East not as one of peace
versus Justice, but rather as one of how much (and what kind) of injustice is to be tolerated
for how much and what kind of peace. Avishai Margalit, Rotten Compromise and Honora-
ble Peace, Tanner Lecture Series at Stanford University (May 4-6, 2005), http://www.stan-
ford.edu/dept/EIS/lecturestanner_04_05.html.
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